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“What improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as inconveniency 
to the whole.  No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the 
members are poor and miserable.”  Adam Smith, the Wealth of Nations  
The integration of the domestic financial markets into broader international markets will 
shape and determine the investment philosophies of companies and investors well into the future.  
It is more important than ever to recognize the significant roles countries play around the world 
in their relationship to each other.  The focus has changed from an isolationist policy, to how to 
manage and constructively build efficiency and standardization internationally.  This new focus 
has brought numerous opportunities for economic growth and prosperity to each country 
involved however attached to this opportunity is multiplied challenges not understood.  The 
global community is currently and will further withstand systemic challenges to their respective 
markets and because of this; the current financial crisis merits our focus.     
The walls that once separated our countries have been shattered and what were once 
referred to as domestic issues are now international problems. We must develop policies that will 
help to ensure stability, confidence and productivity into the domestic and international financial 
markets. A system of effective securities regulation, while adhering to a foundation of market 
incentives, will be the catalyst for increasing market efficiency and investment growth.  For this 
reason I suggest that all new regulatory reform be constructed on the foundation of market 
efficiency and stability with a strict adherence to proactive due diligence.   
It is essential that regulators and governments positions themselves strategically in 
creating a regulatory mechanism that will underscore this criterion.  Regulatory actors in each 
country should be held responsible for helping to frame the new stages of regulatory reform and 
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should understand the complexities and direct impact these new policies will have on real people 
in various economies throughout the world.  Domestic securities regulation should adhere to a 
strict code of bipartisanship and should not be focused on one set school of economic theory or 
political philosophy.  Likewise, international securities regulation should be established around 
the principles of an international partnership of market efficiency that will pursue a strict 
adherence to a domestic regulatory framework.   
This is quite idealistic to state, however if just Keynesian or Classical economic theory 
contained the answers, we would not have hundreds of opinions to say differently.  It is essential 
to note that Adam Smith, John M. Keynes and Milton Freidman all have sound economic 
theories and principles however just one school of economics is not always the answer.  This 
paper is written on the premise of driving a sense collaboration concerning the numerous theories 
of economics to find the optimal balance.  The goal of this paper to lay the frame work for 
further scholarly debate, centered on a balanced and systematic strategy to frame policy, both 
domestically and internationally.     
It is important to understand the reasons for the systemic problems that created and 
escalated the world directly into this financial crisis.  The current financial crisis is not a general 
dichotomy between deregulation and regulation or between the housing bust and corporate giants 
too big to fail.  According JP Morgan and their report entitled Post Modern Asset Management, 
the housing bust was simply the straw the broke the camel‟s back.  JP Morgan states that U.S. 
home prices actually began to decline in 2006 which helped to set the stage for this crisis.
1
  The 
report also alludes to the increased mobility of goods and capital on a globalized landscape 
                                                          
1
 Institutional Asset Management Marketing Department. “Post-Modern Asset Management: The Credit Crisis and 
Beyond.” JP Morgan Chase & Co. 2009 pg 8 
 
6 
 
which led to growth in emerging economies.  This growth contributed to a sharp increase in 
excess global savings.  Emerging countries such as China and India built large current-account 
surpluses and invested in low interest long-term rates in creditor-nation bonds.
2
   
This created an abundance of cheap capital which consumers used to leverage for the 
purchase of real-estate and consumption.  Through this abundance of capital and the enormous 
growth of real-estate leveraging, financial companies began to package these debt instruments in 
hopes of increased corporate revenues and equity returns.
3
  This growth essentially caused a 
bubble in the market which led to speculation driving prices higher.  According to Brian Perry‟s 
article entitled An In-Depth Look at the Credit Crisis, when enough investors come to realize that 
market or security valuations are not supported by fundamentals, the market will begin a 
downward spiral.   
This essentially causes a multiplying effect of investors rushing to sell the underlying 
securities or get out of the market completely.
4
  Perry also discusses what he has perceived as 
two other factors that have helped create the crisis we have today.  The moral hazard problem is 
the excessive leveraging and risk taken by both financial corporations and the individual 
consumers.  However the second is what is known as asset/liability mismatch.  Asset/liability 
mismatch is when a financial corporation has a broad discrepancy between the duration of its 
assets and its liabilities.  
                                                          
2
 Institutional Asset Management Marketing Department. “Post-Modern Asset Management: The Credit Crisis and 
Beyond.” JP Morgan Chase & Co. 2009 pg 8. 
 
3
 Institutional Asset Management Marketing Department. “Post-Modern Asset Management: The Credit Crisis and 
Beyond.” JP Morgan Chase & Co. 2009 pg 9 
4
 Perry, Brian. “An In-Depth Look at the Credit Crisis.” Investopedia a Forbes Digital Company. (2008): 6 
<http://www.investopedia.com/university/credit-crisis/>. 
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An example of this is when commercial banks found it difficult to find short-term 
financing during a period of severe illiquidity.  This is a serious problem in that banks rely 
heavily on this type of financing to conduct day to day business. This was the main reason why 
investment banks such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs became bank holding companies.
5
  
The problem exists when financial institutions employ excessive leveraging.  According to Perry, 
commercial banks traditionally leverage 10 to 12 times their capital whereas investment banks 
were in excess of 30 times capital.  This is a tremendous increase in disproportionate risk to the 
institution as well as the individual investor. 
Table 1 and 2, illustrates the increase in leveraging that has taken place in the U.S. since 
1964.  Table 1 shows the total amount of domestic financial debt represented at $16.9 trillion 
while table 2 illustrates total debt including the government sector at 2.5 trillion.  It is important 
to note that table 2 represents Debt/GDP.  If the line shown is rising, than debt is increasing 
faster than the growth of GDP.   Depending who you talk to, debt is or can be major challenge to 
overall health of a country or to the international financial system.  The difficulty lies in 
determining the right balance or mix of debt that helps to sustain an economy of scale.    
  
 
                                                          
5
 Perry, Brian. “An In-Depth Look at the Credit Crisis,” Investopedia a Forbes Digital Company.(2008):8 
<http://www.investopedia.com/university/credit-crisis/>. 
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Table 1:  
Source: ContraHour U.S. Domestic Debt: What Can Be Expanded, What Must Be 
Reduced?”<http://seekingalpha.com/article/116929-u-s-domestic-debt-what-can-be-expanded-what-must-be-
reduced>, 2009 
 
Table 2:  
Source: ContraHour U.S. Domestic Debt: What Can Be Expanded, What Must Be 
Reduced?”<http://seekingalpha.com/article/116929-u-s-domestic-debt-what-can-be-expanded-what-must-be-
reduced> 2009. 
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However one of the most important factors to understand the systemic challenges this 
crisis has produced is to recognize the underlying reason that some of these actions took place.  
According to Professor Bill George at Harvard University‟s‟ School of Business, it is the notion 
of the lack of trust in our nation‟s leaders.  For example the Center of Public Leadership at 
Harvard‟s Kennedy School of Government, revealed an astounding 80 percent of American 
people believe we have a severe leadership crisis in the this country. The report also states that 
an unprecedented 79 percent believe the United States will decline as a nation if we do not get 
better leadership.
6
  This report took into account both corporate leaders and elected officials.   
It is important to note that confidence in leadership has a direct effect on market 
participation and economic stability.  These problems will rest on the shoulders of those who 
lead us.  The credit crisis will depend essentially how long it takes the credit markets to be liquid 
again.
7
  If banks are unwilling to lend to each other out of fear of the other banks stability then 
this credit crisis will last much longer.  The actions of Henry Paulson, Timothy Geithner and Ben 
Bernanke in taking the approach to bring economic stability through monetary policy are 
essential to not only to the United States but also the international community.   
The failure of government actions to regulate the financial markets, corporate greed and 
the housing bust all contributed to this crisis and to what some are calling the perfect storm.  
Problems such as these have helped to create the financial crisis and unattended to will further 
establish an unprecedented challenge for future generations.  This further highlights the 
argument for an in-depth strategy of forecasts to develop the correct balance of regulatory action 
                                                          
6
 George, Bill, “Failed Leadership Caused the Financial Crisis.” US News & World Report.  19  Nov.2008. 
<http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2008/11/19/failed-leadership-caused-the-financial-crisis.html>. 
  
7
 Thayer, Gary, Economic Comment Historic Changes, Wells Fargo Economic Group, 1 Oct. 2008. 
10 
 
and market efficiency.  Forecasts or expectations of future variables are considered rational if the 
econometrician uses all relevant information that is available during the process of policy 
creation or reform.
8
  Information is a limited resource and regulatory reform will have certain 
political and time constraints.   
Politicians and economist do not have the luxury of unlimited time and information when 
reacting to a crisis.  Therefore it is crucial that the reforms created must be revisited constantly.  
As a result, there should be an attempt to revise the way governments forecast in order to predict 
probable systematic errors.
9
  The financial crisis has initiated great concern with the current 
mechanism of securities regulation and its failed attempts to govern the immense and complex 
investment options available.  Wall Street pioneers admit that some of the complex derivatives 
and collateralized mortgage debentures are too difficult to understand let alone regulate. 
Theories and the descriptions of current regulation presented in this paper will help the 
reader gain a basic understanding of the general driving force of financial policies and more 
importantly, securities regulation. There is currently an immense capitalization of new theories of 
domestic and international securities regulation.  The global financial crisis of 2008 will continue to cause 
systemic challenges that will unfold for years to come.  Already we are seeing inflationary worries and 
protectionist philosophies on an international basis.  Individual investors and corporate executives all 
around the world are all concerned that our current regulatory bodies are not equipped to aide in 
protecting the markets from fraudulent activity.   
Consequently in late 2008 early 2009, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (referred to as the Dow) 
went from 13,000 to 7,500, almost overnight.   The markets, being the leading predictor, that they are, 
                                                          
8
 Baumol and Blinder. Economics Principles and Policy. Hardcourt College Publishers 8
th
 ed. P.718. 
 
9
 Eatwell, Milgate and Newman. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 4 Q to Z. Macmillan Press Limited. 
1987  P.79. 
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showed us we were headed to a severe recession if not a widespread depression domestically and 
internationally.  Some investors saw their respective retirement accounts lose 30 to 40 percent while 
others were left with absolutely nothing.  For this reason a number of people chose to sell their personal 
investments and hide in fixed income vehicles or liquid cash accounts.  The US government knew it had 
to act and act quickly, however because of the typical partisan challenges, initial progress was delayed.    
Today we have laid the ground work for a new economy to emerge.  With only a handful of 
domestic and international large commercial banks remaining, the world as we knew it is over and the 
start of something new has began.  The Securities and Exchange Commission along with Secretary 
Timothy Geithner, Chairman Ben Bernanke and Chairman Mary Schapiro will help to reform America‟s 
current securities regulation and monetary policy.  President Obama and the U.S. Congress will ultimately 
try and sell these regulations to America and the rest of the world.  The current administration will 
develop new legislation and regulation and try to implement it in a very short time.  These new 
regulations will have an undetermined impact on both individual investors and the global economy in 
general. 
It is the responsibility of governments and regulatory actors around the world to create a 
standardized frame work of regulation that is formed around incentives and efficiencies of economic 
growth and stability.  Organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, Securities Exchange 
Commission and the International Organization of Securities Commission will need to act in accordance 
to these regulations and work together to rid the markets of unneeded confusion and fraudulent activity.  
Regulatory objectives must be to create a mechanism that will provide protection and transparency for the 
investor, while at the same time to facilitate investment growth, progress and stability.   
As a result, this paper will focus on three important aspects of regulation.  The first section will 
concentrate on the historical perspective -- where we were.  From the historical perspective I will discuss 
the establishment and role of the Securities and Exchange Commission and how they came about.  I will 
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also describe some of the important regulations that have helped to establish our current securities 
markets.  The second section will be written around the purpose of securities regulation- -where we are.   
Most everyone is trigger happy when discussing more widespread regulation.  In general, 
economists feel that there is a legitimate need for increased regulatory reform and greater disclosure.  
However there should be an unambiguous reason for reform so we gain a solid and clear perspective of its 
purpose and effect.  The third section will concentrate on a normative approach to -- where we are going.  
We will focus on a „Glass-Steagall Act‟ type of reform concerning retirement and the balance of full 
disclosure. This article was written on the level to provide possible normative solutions and to spur 
further scholarly research in the field of securities regulation.  
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“There is with general willingness now to question existing regulatory practices and to 
consider, without prejudice, a wide range of alternative proposals.  Nothing at this juncture is 
too hallowed by tradition and usage to escape questioning and to be off-limits to reform.” 
(Geneva Reports on the World Economy) 
Section 1: Understanding Where We Were 
At this point I will begin to discuss the history of regulation, the purpose of regulation 
and recommendations for and what types of regulations may be necessary in our near future.  
The regulatory constructs of both domestic and foreign governments will help to rebuild 
confidence in the domestic and international financial systems.   The current problems we face 
are unprecedented and complex in nature.  The once held strong multinational corporations were 
no match for today‟s challenges and complex economies.  Essentially in this current day and age, 
the global community has never been this tightly networked and dependent on each society to 
fulfill their responsibilities for the global circulation of goods and services. 
   From the everyday investor to Wall Street pioneers it seems that everyone feels the era 
of deregulation is over and it is now time for the creation and implementation of new and 
improved regulatory constructs.  Most professional, academic and civil servant sectors also 
believe that new regulatory reforms are needed.  Investors among every class have begun to 
internalize massive losses in wealth and are looking for an immediate response from our 
regulators and politicians.    The complex investment vehicle rampant among our markets and 
the current system of lax regulation has and will continue to cause immense challenges 
throughout domestic and international financial systems.  Consequently, we need a general 
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understanding of where we have come from in order to gain a clear perception of future 
normative evaluations and forecasts surrounding securities regulation.     
1.1 Regulation and the Securities and Exchange Commission   
During the 1930‟s, the financial securities markets saw regulatory guidelines increase in 
measure and in scope.  The financial crisis was the catalyst necessary for new regulatory bodies 
and mechanisms to emerge in America during the Great Depression.  The U.S. Congress 
established the Securities Act of 1933 also known as the “Truth in Securities Act”, as one of the 
first attempts of securities regulation after the stock market crash of October 29, 1929.
10
  The 
purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 was to prohibit numerous forms of fraud and to bring 
stability to the securities industry by requiring that all essential information concerning the 
issuance of securities be made available to the investor.
11
   
The Securities Act of 1933 provides the definition of a security and what the legal 
ramifications are that covers the selling and issuance of securities.  According to the Act of „33, 
two prevailing factors should be noted concerning securities.  First, the act requires that the 
investing public is to receive financial and other essential information concerning the security 
that is being offered. Second, the Act should help to facilitate a system to prohibit all types of 
fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation concerning the sale of securities to the public.
12
   
                                                          
10
 Norris, Floyd. “Looking Back at the Crash of ’29.” New York Times 15 Oct. 1999, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/financial/index-1929-crash.html>.  
 
11
 Clarkson, Miller, Jentz and Cross. West’s Business Law 8
th
 ed. United States: West Legal Studies in Business 
Thompson Learning, 2001.  Pg 691. 
 
12
“The Securities and Exchange Commission.” The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry. 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml:>  See 15 U.S.C> Section 77b(a)(1). 
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The Act stipulates that the means to accomplish these goals include creating a mechanism 
to foster the registration of securities.  According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the information provided by the company issuing the security will help to facilitate important 
information to investors making an informed conclusion as to what securities to purchase.
13
  In 
general all securities must be registered with the SEC prior to being sold in the United States.  
Companies must provide information as to the description of the type of business the firm 
conducts and any properties the firm holds or manages.  As well as a description of the securities 
to be offered for sale and any other information that is important to note.  There must also be a 
description of firm management and the financial statements must be certified by an independent 
accountant.
14
      
1.2 Disclosure 
Essentially the Act of „33 lists an all encompassing system of regulation surrounding the 
issuance of securities and the requirement of disclosing essential information to the investor. 
Disclosure is the most discussed form of regulation today.   Technological advances, such as the 
Internet and television, have increased disclosure by firms immensely.   Both internet and the 
television have greatly influenced the facilitation and dissemination of information.
15
 
 The 
disclosure of essential information has also increased through Regulation S-K.  Regulation S-K 
                                                          
13
 “The Securities and Exchange Commission.” The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry. 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml:>  See 15 U.S.C>. 
 
14
“The Securities and Exchange Commission.” The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry. 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml:>  See 15 U.S.C.> Section 77 b(a)(1).  Primary means of accomplishing 
these goals is the disclosure of important financial information through process of securities regulation. This 
information enables investors to make informed judgments about whether to purchase a company's securities. 
While the SEC requires that the information provided be accurate, it does not guarantee it.  
 
15
 Garcia, Tonya PR Week USA Aug 01, 2007 The Internets role in Financial Disclosure Debated 
<http://www.brandrepublic.com/InDepth/Analysis/674732/Internets-role-financial-disclosure-
debated/?DCMP=ILC-BETASEARCH>. 
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provides a mechanism of disclosure for essential information with respect to such matters as a 
firm registrant‟s business model, legal proceedings, properties, financial and non-financial 
statements, directors and officers.
16
   One important part of Regulation S-K is the Management‟s 
Discussion and Analysis.  
 Essentially, MD&A requires the reporting firm to disclose critical data outlined in 
regulatory guidelines and instructions.  MD&A requires the firm to disclose its financial 
condition, current operations, liquidity, and capital resources.  One other important factor to note 
is that if the registrant of regulation S-K has concerns with the firm, then they may require 
further disclosure.
17
   Fundamentally, a major purpose of the registrant is to gain as much 
information as possible of the underlying firm, not only for purpose of registration but also for 
the transparency of the security. 
1.3 Securities and Exchange Commission 
After one year of the most sweeping regulatory reform the world has seen yet, a new 
group of guidelines emerged, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  This act created the SEC 
and further enhanced securities regulation. The SEC was established as an independent 
regulatory agency, the sole function of which is to administer the Securities Act of 1933.
18
  
Today the SEC plays an important role in the creation and implementations of regulations 
                                                          
16
 “The Securities and Exchange Commission.” Regulation S-K:. C.F.R. 299.10-229.702. 23 July 2009 
<http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ecfrlinks.shtml>. 
 
17
 Paredes, Troy. Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Sercuries Regulation. 
Faculty Working Papers Series Washington University School of Law, Saint Louis: 2003. 03-02-02.   
18
 “Sec Historical.” 431 Days:  Joseph P. Kennedy and the Creation of the SEC. 1 Dec. 2005, 
<http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/kennedy/index.php>. 
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governing the issuance and sale of securities.
19
  The SEC regulates the securities industry by 
using numerous mechanisms and systemic practices.   
For starters, the SEC requires full disclosure of what regulators like to call complete 
information, concerning the offering of securities.  They govern new securities listed on the 
primary market as well as the securities being sold on secondary market such as the Over the 
Counter exchange, better known as the OTC exchange.
20
  The SEC investigates fraudulent 
activity and requires registration of securities brokers, broker dealers, and investment advisors.  
They also will recommend administrative sanctions, injunctive procedures, and criminal 
prosecution in cases involving violation of securities laws. 
21
 This act was also responsible for 
the creation of various self-regulatory organizations (SRO‟s).       
1.4 The Creation of Self Regulatory Organizations 
The SEC delegate‟s authority to the National Associations of Securities Dealers or what 
is known today as Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), to aid in the prevention of 
investment fraud and public awareness of topics surrounding the securities markets.  
Organization such as the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and the Pacific 
Stock Exchange were also created through the Act of 1934.  One of the goals of a stock 
exchange is to maximize trading volume and trading efficiency.  Basically the more trading 
                                                          
19
 Clark, Miller, Jentz, and Cross. “Corporations-Securities Regulation and Investor Protecton.” West’s Business Law 
United States: Thomson Learning, 2001. 
 
20
 “The Securities and Exchange Commission.” The Investor’s Advocate:  How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation.  <http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml>. 
 
21
 Clark, Miller, Jentz, and Cross. “Corporations-Securities Regulation and Investor Protecton.” West’s Business Law 
United States: Thomson Learning, 2001. 
 
 
 
18 
 
volume the exchange has the more the exchange maximizes their potential at increasing 
revenues. 
  SOR‟s have for a number of years created and implemented governing aspects in the 
exchanges even before formal regulatory and legislative action was created.
22
  This interesting 
phenomenon occurred both in the United States and United Kingdom securities exchanges.  
Consequently, the exchanges became a type of regulatory body by enforcing policy and 
procedures concerning the buying and selling of securities.  The exchanges enforced policy 
agendas of fair and competitive market actions on the market makers, broker dealers and the 
investors.
23
  
There are of course numerous views concerning regulatory oversight or the securities 
market.  The Classical economist would argue that allowing exchanges to govern the actions of 
securities market as an example of free-markets and highlight their ongoing concern of 
government involvement.  They would stipulate this is all the more reason for governments to 
stay out of the markets and to let the markets regulate themselves through competition.  
Consequently, there are numerous challenges with this position. There are three main reasons 
why the Classical view will not work as efficiently as considered necessary.   
First, SRO‟s do not have the ability to inflect punitive damages on those that break the 
rules of the organization compared to the reach of the state or federal government.  Second, the 
type of action necessary would be costly and challenging for an SRO to continue on a consistent 
                                                          
22
  Coffee, John. The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership 
and Control, Columbia University School of Law. New York: 2000.  Working Paper No182.  
 
23  Coffee, supra note [22], (“the London Stock Exchange changed their rules and guidelines to tighten and require 
issuers to reveal all important information.”).  
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basis.  Third, if previous points hold true the SRO has a weak incentive to enforce rules against 
its own members and clients.
24
  Consequently these views highlight the need for further 
regulatory measures especially those concerned with fraudulent activities and unfair practices.  
1.5 Rule 10b-5 Insider Trading 
The Act of 1934, Section 10(b) rule 10b-5 is essential to note.  The rule in general states 
that it prohibits the use of any manipulative practices that are in direct conflict with SEC rules 
and regulations.  It prohibits fraudulent activities in connection with the purchase, sale or 
issuance of securities.
25
  This is known as one of the most important purposes of Rule 10b-5 
relates to insider trading.  The rule is focused around those investors that have access to 
privileged information that the general public does not have access to.   
As a result, the insider trading rule strictly prohibits officers and executives that have 
privileged positions in a publically traded company, from trading on information until the 
information becomes available to the public.
26
  In the 1980‟s no better description of insider 
trading is the movie “Wall Street”, directed by Olive Stone.  The movie was created to depict 
insider trading and the “greed is good” philosophy. While this movie may have been eluding to 
                                                          
24
 Coffee, supra note [22] Showing an explanation of three reasons that Professor Coffee believes are why 
completion and free-market framework will not be able to stand alone. 
 
25
 “Title 17: Commodity and Securities Exchange, Part 240 General Rules and Regulations Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.”  GPO Access.   <http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
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operate as a fraud or deceit upon any persons, in connection with a security.) 
 
26
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this type of activity in the 1980‟s, insider trading existed well before the Great Depression. 
Originally, insider trading was a restriction in the Act of 1934 under Section 16, however today 
the regulation is listed under Rule 10b-5.
27
   
In 1961, the rule 10b-5 applied to insider trading.  In the 1980‟s the Supreme Court 
adopted insider trading and the rule was framed under a fraudulent activity. 
28
  Basically the 
government was announcing that they no longer believed that insider trading was an externality 
or a market failure that the private markets could control.  They believed that this type of practice 
was essentially an externality that was caused by fraudulent activity.  That regulation should be 
in place to stop and to enforce some type of punitive consequences on those caught in the act.  
There are numerous theories for and against insider trading however I will focus on the activity 
of political actions and actors. 
1.6 Political Economy View of Insider Trading 
 The political economy perspective must highlight the public interest theory of regulation.  
Essentially, the public interest theory of regulation stipulates that governments act in accordance 
to correct market failures.
29
  Insider trading regulation through government involvement would 
be an example of public interest theory.  Essentially, regulatory actors see insider trading as a 
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market failure and they feel that they must step in because the private markets are not equipped 
and lack the incentive to solve these types‟ challenges.   
According to Professor Stigler, there are two main types of market failures, monopolies 
and externalities.   Professor Stigler believes that regulation is critical for the public to be 
protected during these types of events.
30
  Although monopolies‟ are an essential argument for the 
creation and implementation of regulation I am not going to emphasize this theory.  Instead, I am 
going to focus on externalities.  According to Stigler, externalities are basically activated when 
the cost of producing a good or service are not fully integrated into the pricing mechanism.  So 
essentially the investor does not have the information required to make a sound decision and has 
a greater chance of losing their initial investments to externalities.  
In effect, regulation is a social welfare mechanism presented to decrease the externalities 
that hinder markets and cause failures.  A major question and consistent argument concerning 
regulation is where did the regulatory guideline begin and who is behind the creation and 
implementation of that regulation?  Those that oppose the regulation rely on public interest 
theory, to explain that most laws are created under special interest or private interest.
31
  
Consequently, those who support regulation are generally those that rely also on public interest 
theory and explain the law to be fashioned around the issue of externalities and market failures. 
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32
  Regardless, regulatory guidelines have been created and implemented for the purposes of 
decreasing market failures and increasing market participation.  
1.7 Trust Indenture Act of 1939 
There are basically two types of investments, the purchase of equities (common or 
preferred stock) and the purchase of debt securities (bonds or treasuries).  Both are equally 
important and can be a source of income or capital growth to the individual or institutional 
investor.  Typically investors will use both vehicles to build a portfolio that is centered on their 
prospective goals and investment objectives. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 deals with debt 
securities.  Even though the security in question may have already been registered under the 
Securities Act of 1933, there may not be a formal agreement between the issuer and holder of the 
debt security. 
Essentially a corporation that is issuing more than 10 million in debt must provide an 
indenture between the issuer and the trustee that will act on behalf of the bondholder.
33
  The 
trustee is usually a bank or a trust consisting of board members, which will act in the 
bondholders‟ interest not the issuer of the security. The terms and conditions of the bond must be 
spelled out in detail in the indenture.
34
  It is generally thought that investment companies, such as 
broker dealers, financial services companies and/or mutual funds are created for the buying, 
selling and research of certain investments.  This area is often overlooked concerning securities 
regulations. 
                                                          
32
 James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the Chicago School, Duke Law Journal. Vol. 
1986 No. 4 Durham NC: Sept. 1986. < http://www.jstor.org/pss/1372486>. 
33
 “Securities and Exchange Commission.” Trust Indenture Act of 1939.  2004 Sept. 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/tia39.pdf>. 
 
34
 “Title 15 Commerce and Trade.”  Securities and Trust Indentures. 2008 Jan. 
<http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/15C2A.txt>. 
23 
 
1.8 The Act’s of 1940  
It is universally held that the general public commonly does not have much trepidation 
concerning investment companies.  Nor does the public feel that these companies harbor any 
activity that will cause or create fraudulent actions.  However with the recent fall of some of the 
largest institution in history, there is now a renewed interest in regulation covering investment 
companies.  Numerous hedge funds, banks, and broker dealers have aided in the creation of 
fraud, ponzi schemes and poor investment decisions.  This is where the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 exacts authority.   
Essentially, the Act requires the registration and regulation of investment companies.  
The purpose is to effectively reduce abuses in selling securities and to help assure investors of 
adequate and complete information.  The Act requires that all investment companies register 
with the SEC and adhere to the rules and regulations that have already been established through 
prior actions taken by Congress and the SEC.
35
  One micro-level policy that is clearly seen as an 
important regulation to the investing public is the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.   
This Act created an enforcement mechanism which established policy and procedure that 
investment advisors must be registered and adheres to regulations administered by the SEC.
36
  In 
general the investment advisor is a person who provides recommendation concerning a specific 
security.  The Act of 1940 aides in providing registration concerning the advisor essentially 
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because they provide recommendations to their clients; and receive compensation for these 
services.
37
  However there are some that are excluded from registration requirements of the Act.    
For example banks, bank holding companies, or providers of advice that is incidental to 
their profession.  These providers could be but are not limited to lawyers, accountants, engineers 
and teachers.  They are exempt as long as they do not hold themselves as advisor to the public, 
they do not charge a fee for their services and the advice they give is under reasonable terms 
related to their occupation.
38
  
Some individual investors have consistently had less confidence in their investment 
advisors ability to give unbiased and professional advice without hidden agendas.  Essentially 
every advisor has an opinion on what they have interpreted as being a quality sound investment.  
You can take ten advisors and they will give you ten different opinions concerning the same 
security under question.  The industry has made strides in trying to create a sense of confidence, 
structure and consistency in the advisors by introducing new and improved product lines, such as 
managed or advisory products.   
 The advisor acknowledges that they can give aggregated investment advice concerning 
where to invest and how to invest, but leaves the actual management of money in the 
professional managers hands.  These types of accounts however have an interesting performance 
metrics.  Essentially the advisor and the investor contractually agree to a certain fee for the 
management of the entire account.  The advisors compensation is tied directly to the 
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performance of the account.  Essentially if the account performs positively or negatively, the 
advisor is only going to get the contractually agreed upon rate.   Therefore it is an incentive for 
the account to perform positively for the given year. 
1.9 Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
The mid to late 1990‟s and early 2000‟s were plagued by fragile corporations and the 
questionable accounting practices that surrounded them.  Many corporations were inducing what 
they referred to as creative accounting measures.
39
  This made it almost impossible for the 
general public to really know what they were investing in.  Most general investors will invest 
into whatever company their investment advisor recommends for them or what the research 
report is declaring.  However if the advisor or research company is making their respective 
recommendations based off incorrect accounting information, the investor will be making their 
decision from untruthful and incomplete information. 
  This is a violation of the Securities Act of 1933.  Hence former President George W. 
Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 into law. The law created a number of reforms to 
improve corporate responsibility in the creation of financial disclosure and to aid in prohibiting 
accounting fraud.  The Act also created the Pubic Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
(PCAOB) to oversee the auditing profession.
40
  Sarbanes-Oxley, of course had its fair share of 
challenges with the private sector.  Firms argued essentially that this requirement would decrease 
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business efficiency and production; however, the regulation has been proven useful in the last 
few years.   
1.10 International Securities Regulation 
There are numerous agencies and regulatory bodies throughout the international world.  
All major countries adhere to some degree of regulatory constructs.  Regulatory systems have 
been created and implement on a domestic scale; however, international regulation centers itself 
on financial and economic mechanisms, underlying macro-level constructs.  Consequently 
international securities regulations are very similar to the domestic versions that were already 
outlined.  Therefore we are focusing on disclosure which seems to be the driving force behind 
the creation of domestic and international regulation. 
 One important organization to note is the International Organization of Securities 
Commission.  Essentially, the IOSCO is an organization that has helped to create and maintain 
numerous financial and securities regulations by bringing together countries around the world to 
focus on disclosure.  The IOSCO was founded in 1974 as the Inter-American Conference of 
Securities Commission and they currently have 182 members.  This organization is the foremost 
important organization concerning international securities regulation however they currently are 
not equipped with an effective enforcement mechanism.
41
   
The IOSCO is very concerned with full disclosure on an international scale.  With the 
release of the documents entitled, Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offering and Initial 
Listings by Foreign Issuers and the International Disclosure Principles of Cross-Border 
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Offerings and Listings of Debt Securities by Foreign Issuers, the organization plans to take the 
issue head on.  Through these documents and other actions the IOSCO helped to create an 
enhancement to the disclosure of information offered by multinational issuers of securities.
42
  
Through these actions, regulators hope to add more integrity in the financial markets which will 
in turn help to create investor protection on an international scale.      
Organizations such as the World Bank and International Finance Corporation, seek to 
find solutions in the private sector to increase economic development through investments in 
emerging countries.  Basically these organizations help to establish systems and solutions for the 
flow of currencies, loan instruments and the movement of trade between countries.  However the 
European Union has created and delivered a wide range of incentives concerning regulation 
among its 27 member countries.  The Financial Stability Forum (FSF), in the EU has been given 
responsibility of converging international financial regulation.
43
  FSF will work closely with the 
IMF on the macro-economic level however, for the first time the EU will introduce a micro-
economic approach to systemic financial and securities regulation.
44
  The EU will do this by 
creating policy and procedural guidelines for financial firms and security transactions.  
This section outlined the historical perspective of where we have come from.  One can 
see that regulatory constructs have been around for quite some time.  It seems that there is a 
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common thread throughout this section, that crisis seems to be the catalyst for regulatory reform.  
It is easier to construct and reform regulation when we are going through a market failure 
however it is much more or a challenge to consistently modify our markets and systems.  Being 
reactive only produces inefficiency. Being progressive with a strict adherence to regulatory 
principles allows regulation to be tested and policies to be reformed for the purpose of market 
efficiency.  This is the primarily reason why it is crucial to understand the purpose of regulation.     
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“Many people want the government to protect the consumer; a much more urgent problem is to 
protect the consumer from the government.”  Milton Friedman 
Section 2: Understanding Where We Are 
It is essential for one to understand the purposes of regulation before recommendations 
can begin.  I have already alluded to a few factors that are inherently focused on the goal of 
decreasing systemic levels of fraudulent activity, market failures and market instability.  
Politicians and economist alike, use times of systemic crisis to fuel the fires of reform and 
creation of regulations.  I argue, however the idea of continued reform and progressive thought is 
a more sound approach in the development and maintenance of securities regulations than the 
current reactive approach fueled by crisis.  There are three distinct reasons for improved 
regulatory reform both domestically and internationally.   
2.1 Fraud and Complex Investments 
The first is to decrease the amount of fraudulent investment practices that have plagued 
the world markets.  From the fall of Bernard Madoff‟s fifty billion dollar Ponzi scheme to the 
alleged securities fraud of Stanford Investments, the challenges of the last few quarters are 
unprecedented and seem insurmountable by most standards.
45
  For example, the FBI has opened 
more than five hundred investigations into corporate fraud, of which included thirty eight cases 
that involved major firms.
46
 Concerning financial institutions, another important investment 
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concern is to decrease systemic and complex investment practices at the firm and at the exchange 
level.  By enforcing deregulation of complex practices, two pillars of Wall Street, Bear Sterns 
and Leman Brothers, were no match against the systemic challenges of the current financial 
crisis.   
Individuals and institutional investors would have never believed that these firms had 
anything to be concerned about. Some economist have argued that publicly traded companies 
believed it necessary to put their firms at risk for benefit of higher returns on investment and 
shareholder approval.  Investors look for unattainable long run returns and this further creates the 
need for the continued development of competitive markets.  The 1990‟s created a desire for 20 
and 30 percent return on investment at a consistent basis.  As a result, the investing public began 
to believe that this was a normal pattern and expected this type of market performance in the 
short-run and in the long-run as well.  This type of behavior became internalized by the general 
public and emerged into corporate leaders as demand for higher returns and greed became 
prevalent.   
 There are no investment vehicles that I am aware of that will return this type of 
performance on a long-term scale.  This type of behavior created the need for firms to construct 
new and complex investment mechanisms.  Unfortunately these multifaceted investments and the 
mismanagement of corporations were a precursor to the complexities of the financial crisis.  
Consequently, because of the high degree of government beauracracies, few regulations were 
created to oversee these multifaceted challenges.  Complex derivatives and multilayered 
structured products will create high degrees of unnecessary risk and further underlines the need 
of disclosure requirements.  If these products remain unregulated then they will aide in additional 
uncertainty and fraudulent activity in both domestic and international markets.  
31 
 
2.2 Restoration of Investor Confidence 
Secondly, there is a specific need to restore investor confidence in financial securities and 
the systems of exchanges that manage our finances.   Chairman Mary Schapiro, of the SEC, 
addressing the Committee of Appropriations of the US House of Representatives, said that 
investor confidence is the primary focus of the organization.  Schapiro suggested a major 
overhaul to the regulatory mechanism of the SEC, should be conducted immediately.  She further 
stressed a focus on solving impending challenges that are taking place on a global scale. 
Schapiro also suggested that there is a renewed commitment to protecting investors.
47
   
It is important that we rebuild confidence to both domestic and international investors 
however we must not stymie growth and efficiency within our markets.  Without reform in 
critical areas concerning securities and financial regulation; the investor will not feel safe and 
confident that systemic issues have been rectified.  Consequently, as long as these complex 
challenges exist we will not see an increase in the flow of capital towards financial securities.  
Investors in general will continue to keep the majority of their capital in fixed assets such as 
treasury bills or certificate of deposits compared to moving their money into growth focused 
investments, such as equities.  The goal of our governments, firms, and societies, should be for 
the flow of capital to have limited constraints, to build effective incentives for further 
competition and for investors to have a greater degree of confidence in the financial and 
securities markets.   
2.3 The Cycle of Business 
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The third plausible reason for improved reform is to develop regulatory mechanisms that 
will support and manage the economic/business cycle.  Consequently, some economists argue to 
get rid of the business cycles completely; while others call for free and competitive markets 
which are cyclical by nature.  It is well known that cycles or fluctuation occur consistently in 
economies today.  Most economists and politicians believe that in order to effectively manage 
the business cycle, that they should utilize both monetary and fiscal policy.   However, other 
economists believe that business cycles are essentially normal activities in the market and the 
constraints of regulation should be reduced if not eliminated. Economist and politicians should 
not try and rid societies of these cycles but instead focus their efforts in managing the severity of 
both peaks and troughs. 
Consequently, economist, politicians, and social scientist have devoted much time to 
decreasing the harsh side of business cycles.  There have been numerous amounts of research 
and theories produced over the years, concerning why business cycles happen and how to 
manage them properly.  Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell are the fathers of the business 
cycle as we know it today.  In their book, Measuring Business Cycles, the authors underline the 
definition of business cycles; 
“Type of fluctuation found in the aggregate economic activity of nations that 
organize their work mainly in the business enterprises: a cycle consists of 
expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, 
followed by similarly general recessions, contractions and revivals which merge 
into the expansion phase of the next cycle.”  (Burns & Mitchell 468)  
33 
 
 
Source: Seguin Financial Group, Economic Cycles: 
<http://www.seguinfinancial.com/Economic_Cycles.htm>. 
 
There are four main areas of cyclical determinants that make up what economist today 
use to understand and measure aggregate productivity and employment in business cycles.  
According to Able, Bernanke, and Croushore, a period during the business cycle when aggregate 
economic activity is decreasing is a contraction or what is known as a recession.  A recession is a 
depression if the decreased activity remains severe.  After reaching the low point or bottom of 
the contraction, what is known as a trough, the aggregate economic activity begins to increase.  
When aggregate economic activity increases during the cycle it is known as an expansion.  The 
process from a peak to peak or trough to trough is a called a business cycle.
48
    
  In Keynesian theory the government generally does not wait for natural shocks to 
improve gross domestic product and full-employment.  Keynesian‟s believe that government 
spending through fiscal and monetary policy will help generate more demand for goods and 
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services even if people are not willing to consume goods.
49
  Consequently, Classical economists 
do not believe in managing economic cycles this way and would prefer that governments allow 
natural shocks through competition to improve or change economic cycles. Concerning 
economic cycles, what is the best mechanism of achieving efficiency in the markets and how do 
we effectively manage the complexities of the business cycle? 
   There are of course numerous arguments and differing objectives when discussing 
economic/business cycles.  According to Burns and Wesley, many economic indicators move 
collectively throughout the process of a business cycle.  For example, during an expansion output 
rises and at the same time employment rises.  Conversely, during a contraction output of goods 
and service decline and so does employment.  Professor Christian Romer, points out that the 
term business cycle is a misleading concept.  She says that cycle implies that there is some 
degree of irregularity in the timing and duration of cycle itself.  Consequently, most modern day 
economists refer to the business cycle as fluctuations. 
50
    
Professor Romer also believes that just as there are no regularities‟ in the timing of 
business cycles, there is no reason why cycles have to occur.
51
  For example, she believes that an 
economic activity namely full employment is a place where the economy could essentially stay 
forever.  If nothing disturbs the economy, full-employment level of output, which tends to 
naturally grow as the population increases and new technologies are discovered, can be 
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maintained forever.  Business cycles or economic fluctuations occur because of disturbances to 
the economy. 
52
  This theory however, would seem to work in academic circles however would 
be relentlessly challenged in real societies because of the complexities of governments and 
economies today.    
Professor Romer also believes that the cause of volatility in an economy is in direct 
correlation to policy changes.  Recessions are a constant challenge because policy is encouraged 
to reduce inflationary measures and inflation is a persistent problem because of policy.  
Consequently, she believes we have replaced the naturally occurring prewar boom-bust cycles 
with postwar boom-bust cycle driven by policy.
53
  If Professor Romer‟s theory is correct then the 
type and execution of policy has the ability to effect change in an economy.  For this reason, 
benefit-cost analysis should be used as an efficient way at evaluating the pros and cons 
associated with policy reform. 
2.4 Benefit-Cost Analysis 
According to Professor Paul Portney, Benefit-Cost Analysis or BCA is a theory that was 
created because economist and politicians alike have identified over the years that policy applied 
into markets sometimes allocates resources inefficiently.  BCA is concurrently used for 
environmental policies however the theories focus is inherently concerned with gainers and 
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losers.  A central philosophy with BCA is the effect of policy adjustments on a society, are more 
or less the aggregate effects on the individuals who comprise society.
54
   
Understanding this, it should not be the objective of policy makers to construct policies 
and legalities that will constrain economic stability and market efficiency.  According to Joskow 
and Noll economist explain the existence of regulation as to correct market failures and protect 
improperly informed consumers from impairment.
55
  Actors among social regulatory bodies‟ 
intentions should essentially be to drive economic growth, stability and limit market failures.  As 
the economies of the world progress so should the regulatory objectives of financial securities 
underlying both growth and stability.  
2.5 Changes in the Economy Merit Changes in Regulation 
 The financial securities markets cannot operate efficiently without the trust of the 
individual to institutional investors.  The investor needs to have either developed trust or have 
the capability of past activities to verify the market, exchange and/or corporation are trustworthy.  
If markets are unbridled with fraudulent and manipulative activities, investors will move their 
money to find a safer investment option.  For example, the investor may purchase a treasury bill 
or a certificate of deposits at a commercial bank in place of purchasing equities through an 
exchange.  These challenges have increased investor responsibilities and understanding of 
various investment options. 
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Securities markets are in an extraordinary transitional period.  Just a few years ago 
employees had defined benefit plans where the worker would receive a certain financial award at 
retirement.  Now, the majority of companies rely heavily on defined contribution investment 
options, where the employees fund their own retirement.  This new practice may have 
consequences not yet understood.  The difficulty underlies the fact that enormous amounts of the 
investors that lost an immense amount of capital in their respective retirement accounts. 
In 1975, the value of private pension assets corresponds to only 18% of GDP. 
Consequently, recent policy changes show pension plan assets represent 60% of GDP, of which 
70% is a defined contribution plan.
56
  In addition, there has been an increase in institutional 
ownership from less than 10% in the 1930‟s to more than 70% in today‟s market.  
Fundamentally this shifts the objectives of social regulatory bodies concerned the individual 
investor to forming policy initiatives around mutual funds, pension funds, and several other asset 
management funds.
57
 These types of problems may have systemic issues concerning market 
performance centered on an individual‟s retirement objectives. 
If patterns are consistent, those that have 10 to 20 working years left will most likely not 
have any real challenges in amassing investment capital.  Concerning this current financial crisis, 
investors in retirement or has only a few working years left, will likely not have a chance at 
recapturing their respective savings. Unfortunately the investor may have to continue to work or 
possibly downsize their current living standards.  Obviously these enormous groups of investors 
are looking for ways at building back their respective retirement accounts.   
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This section outlined the purpose of regulatory reform; to provide growth and stability 
back into the markets.  The purpose of regulation can take multiple forms.  There are some 
branches of economics that continually call for greater levels of regulatory power and oversight; 
while others are looking for ways to give private markets increased freedom and competition.  
However if one theory worked all the time we would not have amassed the hundreds of theories 
we have today, that says differently.  So essentially, regulation exists to provide markets with 
efficiency, stability, growth and integrity.   
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“If you don’t visit the bad neighborhoods, the bad neighborhoods are going to visit you.” 
Thomas Friedman 
Section 3: Understanding Where We Are Going 
 The intent of this section is not necessarily to explain in context of where we are headed 
under domestic and international regulatory framework.  However this section is to essentially 
discuss and develop probable scenarios for where we are going as a country and a global community.  
This section was created under the normative response to financial crisis and regulatory reform.  
Some economists believe that response to crisis is a means for regulatory reform.  According to 
Joskow and Noll, economists explain the existence of regulation as to correct market failures and 
protect inadequately informed consumers from impairment.
58
   
3.1 Regulation is Dependent on Crisis 
If this view is correct then we should assume that our independent variable is crisis and our 
dependent variable is regulation.  Essentially, regulation is dependent on crisis in order for social 
regulatory bodies to construct, reform, and implement new guidelines.  According to Joskow and 
North, all theories in social science builds on concepts of human behavioral assumption or what is 
better known as rational choice theory.59  Stating that is important to understand the variables used 
concerning transaction cost in the development of regulatory reform.   
 
3.2 Transaction Costs 
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Coase, North and Williamson are most notably known for their work on constructing the 
concepts of transaction cost.  Although Coase initially developed the notion of transaction cost, for 
the purposes of this paper I am going to discuss North‟s‟ perspectives.   According to North, 
institutions provide the basic procedures and mechanisms because individuals seek to create order 
and endeavored to eradicate uncertainty in market exchange.  As a result, institutions and technology 
work in concert to establish transaction and conversion costs.  Institutions are therefore creating a 
mechanism of profitability and feasibility in engaging in economic activity.60  Without institutions 
and technology the basic construct of economic activity would be severely inefficient and ineffective. 
This type of inefficiency would establish costly outcomes to economic growth and stability.  
According to North, the cost of information is a key to understanding the costs of transaction; which 
is consistent concerning the costs of measuring value and the exchange of goods.  These costs also 
are in direct linear relationship with protecting rights and the enforcement of policy agreements.61  
The dichotomy between economic activity and regulation should be modeled at a macro-economic 
level but broken down to a micro-economic level, of costs that are associated with the exchange of 
goods and services.   
In effect at times there exists a diminishing return of policy reform along the curve as cost 
outweighs the benefits of increased growth and stability.  In order to develop regulatory framework, 
it is essential to assess the transaction costs concerned in each proposed regulation. The transaction 
cost would be concerned with states and federal regulatory bodies along side of securities exchange 
activity.62  Of course these costs are developed and implemented at a macro level when it should also 
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be necessary to understand opportunity costs at an individual level.  It is however a mistake to 
suggest that regulation in itself stymies economic activity or competition completely.  
3.3 Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Transactional costs are a byproduct of regulation and because of this one must focus on the 
optimum level of regulatory guidelines for economic activity and competition to continue to be 
developed.  In section two I have alluded to the importance of benefit-cost analysis (BCA) or some 
similar construct that will allow the policy actor the ability to judge current regulations and the 
possibility of reform.   Therefore we should gain an understanding of just how BCA works and how 
it can be developed to assist policy makers.  It is important to note, while most economic models are 
at the macro-economic level BCA breaks down activity to the micro-economic or individual level.  
This is important because at the micro level decisions for policy reform are more quantifiable in their 
effects towards the markets of individual actors. 
BCA essentially measures the change of benefits for those individuals that either were 
winners or losers through the proposed or already initiated policy.  Consequently, benefits are 
measured by the willingness of the individuals to pay for the perceived economic output while the 
cost associated with policy is reflected in the amount of compensation required to offset any negative 
consequences.63  While BCA is usually used as a normative theory when analyzing environmental 
policies, it can be useful to analyze other policy reforms as well.  When new regulations are 
constructed and implemented into markets, due diligence is a necessary action.   
3.4 The Political Economy Approach to Regulatory Reform 
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    The political economy approach to regulatory reform has a unique perspective.  Currently 
most regulation is an expressed reaction to crisis.  The political economy approach is a proactive 
action that could cause regulatory bodies to be in front of crisis.  The approach attempts to provide a 
analysis of how and why regulations evolve and how shocks lead to normative policy change.  
According to Kroszner and Stratmann, there are few items to consider when developing normative 
theories concerning regulatory reform under the umbrella of welfare policies.64   
Kroszner, subscribes to three areas, first being education.  He believes that the public should 
be made aware of the potential costs of regulatory reform.  Rather than wait for the crisis to unfold 
and bad policies to be implemented, there should be a more proactive approach concerning reform.  
Second, Kroszner believes that competition among rival interest groups can increase beneficial 
reforms.  If these rival groups have an incentive to compete against each other in addition to 
competition with the consumer, they would be less likely to support incompatible and inefficient 
regulation. 
Third he believes that government and regulatory institutions play a crucial role in the 
development of regulations.  Those specific committees in Congress or Parliament with 
responsibility for banking and financial guidelines will most likely be set up to provide an important 
debate which will incorporate the evolution of information progression.65  Consequently, it is not in 
the regulation itself where challenges may be created it is the lack of institutional assessments after 
the fact.  By creating incentive models for regulatory bodies to be proactive, we will help to reduce 
future predicaments and decrease the current model of regulation being dependent on crisis.  One 
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way to do this is by understanding what type of shocks may cause a disturbance in the current 
equilibrium.66 
Shocks for example, in an economy will have an effect on elasticity of demand, and this 
will create or erode economic activity in an underlying society.  For example, the increase in 
technology, regulation and transportation costs has changed the way everyday business is 
conducted.   There was a time not too long ago, where an investor would have to meet with a 
financial advisor to buy or sell a security in a given exchange or market.  However with the 
development of the internet, investors can simply bring up their on-line self-directed brokerage 
accounts and initiate a transaction by the click of a button.   
Those same transactions that once took a few hours to initiate now only take a few 
seconds.  Institutions are responsible in keeping track and the adherence of regulatory guidelines 
throughout their respective security exchange systems.  An example of this is trading certain 
types of securities that can only be traded in specific blocks of time.  Also with a diminishing 
need for the financial advisor, transaction costs for the firm were decreased as well.  This shock 
essentially decreases the need for brick and mortar broker dealers and the financial advisor 
themselves.  The competitive landscape is different and a new economy of scale has emerged.  
This scenario should cause some alarm at the regulatory level concerning investor education. 
3.5 The Focus on Investor Protection 
 The purpose of regulation is to construct a mechanism for investor‟s protection, market 
stability and efficiency.  Investors will be hesitant to invest in an exchange or market if they are 
not fully confident that regulatory constructs have been developed in order to create safe and 
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efficient markets.  This well known trend helps to creates incentives for institutions to construct 
and establish fair and efficient markets as well.  At the same time this allows profit minded 
institutions the ability to focus on providing aide in the further maintenance of efficiency and 
stability in security markets.     
Full disclosure and transparency are at the heart of regulation.  However the majority of 
investors rely much more heavily on how well the security is performing currently or since 
inception.  Out of the hundred or so friends and colleagues I have met over the years, there is 
only a handful that has ever taken the time to read a balance sheet or the board meeting minutes 
of the company or fund they own.  Therefore disclosure should also be concerned micro-
economic modeling and its effects on the individual investor.  This highlights a hope that the 
investor will gain a good understanding of the securities they own.   
Currently securities regulation both domestically and internationally provides constructs 
around a social welfare context.   According to Merritt Fox, securities regulation usually 
encourages the support of the individual investor over the institutional shareholder.  They 
encourage market stability which is essentially macro-economic stability, in a collective action 
framework while promoting accuracy of capital allocation.
67
  This is to say that institution such 
as the SEC or the IOSCO should be consumed with investor protection and market efficiency at 
the macro level while allowing uniform laws at the state level to regulate at the micro level.  
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3.6 Uniform Securities Act 
According to John Coffee, state laws do very little in protecting the investor, are usually 
overshadowed by federal law and are irrelevant to international securities law.
68
 State law must 
however be set up to work in concert with federal law. At sometime in the future, international 
law should also be required to work under some type of Uniform Securities law as well.  The 
Uniform Securities Act essentially gives the state the responsibility of enforcing securities 
regulation at the micro level.  This networked relationship between federal and state levels could 
be a prototype of securities law on an international standpoint.  Concerning international law, the 
SEC has begun to work with Canada through the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System.  
3.7 International Network 
 
 
According to Douglas North, the SEC is concerned with fraud in the U.S. capital markets 
from foreign bodies.   The SEC is highly concerned with pressures received to relax regulation of 
domestic companies and foreign companies.  Because of this, the SEC has greater concern with 
externalities that may influence our market stability and regulatory reform.
69
  Understanding this, 
it is quite significant that MJDS exists between the United States and Canada as a prototype for 
other countries.  This type of network is helping the U.S. to extend its current network of 
securities regulation, from a domestic to an international context.   
Consequently, the European Union has already made significant strides towards this 
international approach in current financial and banking regulation.  With its 27 member states the 
E.U. is aware of some of the challenges that may exist under taxation, sovereignty and state 
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specific regulatory constructs.
70
  Other areas of concern on a domestic and international level are 
hedge fund markets, collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps.  These investment 
vehicles are not currently regulated.  For example, credit default swaps have grown from zero to 
44 trillion dollars in just ten years, alluding to further disclosure and regulatory needs.
71
 
3.8 Lack of Transparency 
Securities such as these have little to no collateral posted for these contracts.  Companies 
such as AIG, Citi Bank, and other commercial banks have massive exposure to Credit Default 
Swaps.
72
  Both public and private markets are not closely watched, scrutinized or regulated in the 
least; and has ultimately helped to cause insurmountable decreased in wealth not only 
domestically but internationally as well. Once again the argument is raised that it is not 
regulation that we should be scared of it is what type of regulation that is applied to the markets.  
These types of securities are too broad and complex for most investors to understand the 
complexities they represent to firms, which further highlights the need for transparency.    
According to Luigi Zingales, the lack of transparency concerning the hedge fund market 
makes it very difficult to determine whether the performance of the fund is due to trading 
guidelines, excessive risk taking or chance.
73
  Zingales also alludes to the lack of transparency, 
which can create the suspicion of insider trading and front running.  It is also difficult to evaluate 
                                                          
70
 “The European Union.”Key Facts and Figures about Europe and the Europeans.” 
<http://europa.eu/abc/keyfigures/index_en.htm>.  
 
71
 Zinglales, Luigi. Testimony on Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy. Before the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, United States House of Reps. Washington: 2008. 
 
72
 Zinglales, Luigi. Testimony on Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy. Before the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, United States House of Reps. Washington: 2008. 
73
 Zingales, Luigi, The Future of Securities Regulation, Working Paper No. 08-27. University of Chicago NBER and 
ECGI, 2009. Chicago: 2009. 
 
47 
 
the systemic effects of their activity. For example just how much are the fund‟s investments tied 
into the pro-cyclical economy, other companies and funds alike?
74
  Transparency is a necessity 
when protecting the investor from market instability and fraudulent activity. 
3.9 Information Management 
 Securities regulation is constructed under the context of greater disclosure and 
transparency.  Most will suggest that transparency of securities with no oversight would not be 
sufficient, as noted above.  Some argue that the individual investor does not have the cognitive 
ability to manage the endless amount of disclosure and research presented on a given company.  
According to Herbert Simon, cognitive capabilities are a scarce resource that has to be allocated.  
This is crucial because most people do not have the ability to attend to all information available 
at the time of the decision.
75
   
Another way of looking at this is to assume that the majority will find the most efficient 
way of acquiring information they perceive to be important in making an investment decision.  
As a result, people decide how much time and effort to spend on a task and rationally exclude 
certain types of information.  Essentially with limited cognitive constraints it is impossible to 
consider every piece of information and would make the decision-making process unmanageable 
and overwhelming.
76
  People have limited time, cognitive constraints and are consistently finding 
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new ways of efficiency. This highlights the fact that some people will ignore plausible 
information in lieu of their ultimate objective, performance.  
According to Martin Lindstrom‟s book, buy-ology, there is currently a major push in 
neuroscience to better understand how to market to the consumer.  There was a study that was 
carried out by Dr. Alan Hirsch, where researchers placed identical pairs of Nike running shoes in 
two separate rooms.  One room was pumped full of light floral scents and the other room was 
not.  Volunteers examined the running shoes in each room and then filled out questionnaires.  
Consequently, 84% of the volunteers preferred the running shoes in the floral scented room.
77
   
I am not arguing that we pump floral scents into financial securities however I am 
drawing the conclusion of how people actually make decisions.  Basically these shoes were 
identical in form and in function; therefore we can conclude that the volunteers preferred the 
shoes in the floral scented room because of how the scents made them feel.   This study shows a 
strong correlation that people make decisions because of how it makes them feel.  How then do 
we tie this into investments and to securities related regulatory reform?  By arguing the fact that 
it is important the investor feels safe concerning their investment options and the markets they 
invest in.     
Is it really that essential that we offer unending amounts of information and research to 
the consumer or investor?  According to Professor Parades, if the buyer does not internalize the 
information given, even if the aggregate benefits exceed the cost of producing the information, 
the buyer will not demand this information.
78
  This creates the need for a monopoly in regards to 
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research and regulation.  With limited time and cognitive constraints people are looking for a one 
stop shop that will adequately provide information, disclosure and transparency, so that the 
investor can make a well educated decision.      
3.10 Glass-Steagall Act  
 The Glass-Steagall Act was first introduced in 1933 post-depression era as a way of 
separating investments and commercial banking.  The reason for this was concluded that banks 
in the pre-depression era were considered to be too speculative with consumer capital.
79
  This 
paper fundamentally raises awareness for a form of Glass-Steagall Act regulation, in the 
separation of mutual funds in a defined contribution plan.  It also highlights the need for the 
creation of specialized mutual funds for retirement purposes only.  The reason for this separation 
is that the individual investors are taking on too much exposure to risk with the very money that 
will sustain his or her family through retirement.   
During the past two decades the numbers of defined contribution plans have increased 
quite dramatically, while defined benefit plans have been consistently decreasing.
80
  The number 
of employees with a defined contribution plan has risen considerably from 11.5 million to 30.1 
million since 1990
81
  This shows the direction of retirement accounts in general and the need to 
focus our energies towards correct asset allocation models and investor education.  The goal is 
that risk adverse individuals will reach a higher level of utility under a defined contribution plan 
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than under a defined benefits plan. For savvy investors this statement is even more correct.
82
  To 
further highlight this, the average level of wealth accumulated in defined contribution plans 
depend primarily on investor asset allocation models.
83
 
 
It is also a well known fact that defined contribution providers have severe time 
constraints to officially advise the participant on what investments might be advantageous to 
reach their respective retirement goals.  Defined contribution providers generally give one or two 
advisors responsibility of thousands of plan participants.  These advisors usually deliver some 
general marketing materials for investor participation and skim through current securities 
regulation. The advisor will also try and define the investor‟s respective asset allocation model.  
However the investor consistently feels overwhelmed and inadequate in making decision as to 
where they should invest their money. 
  This has created an enormous educational gap, requiring the individual investor to 
essentially attain a high degree of knowledge concerning investment options and retirement 
goals. With an increase in investment terminology and complexities, we are pushing the 
individual investor into increase risk exposure in their retirement accounts. According to Jeremy 
Siegel, the market returns on an historical basis only 5 to 7 percent.
84
  If the market generally 
return is 5 to 7 percent, why should we expose the investor, in their defined contribution 
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accounts, to the risk of aggressive and volatile investment options, when a more conservative 
approach will do?   
We are placing too much responsibility on the investor; by requiring they make quality 
financial decisions having time and knowledge constraints.  The money invested in retirement 
accounts should be separated from speculative investments and placed in a very conservative 
investment option.  If the investor wants to be exposed to greater risk with the potential of higher 
returns than the investor should open separate investment accounts in addition to their retirement 
account.  One perspective might be that the investors retirement account should be invested in a 
long-term conservative asset allocation model only, which would give the investor the capacity 
to have a clearer picture of their saving at retirement.    
 
3.11 Corporate Governance 
 
   
The argument then raises the question, are strong corporations willing to structure their 
firms around shareholders interest?   I have already alluded to the fact that shareholders have 
internalized the need for high returns on their investments and on a long-term scale.  
Corporations have also internalized this behavior in their quest for growth and increased share 
value.  Let‟s assume that most corporations seek to maximize share value and that managers will 
seek growth opportunities to align with shareholder interests.  If this is the case then there are a 
few theories to note.   
In well established countries that have a system of securities regulation, the investor has 
disclosure rights and feels more aware of practices surrounding the company they are investing 
in.  Corporation and shareholder interests are likely to be aligned in countries in which the 
52 
 
shareholder has disclosure rights of the corporation‟s financial statements and performance. 85   
The marginal investors in these countries will not be willing to purchase shares when they know 
that some shareholders have greater access to disclosure then they do.  As a result of this 
scenario corporate managers will most likely only issue a limited number of shares.   One way to 
combat this is through lobbying.   
If the underlying country has a system of laws and regulations then it is assumed that 
lobbying may allow smaller groups to exert political influence on regulation and/or legislation.
86
 
Lobbying could essentially occur at the firm level, through the corporation‟s board members.  
This however will depend on each company individually and will further construct the argument 
for micro-level policy reform.  Unfortunately, some board members of companies especially in 
the U.S. have lost power to managers of the corporations.   
This would be ill-fated to shareholders; if they are seeking outside advice to help manage 
the firm‟s directives.  However the shareholder is only concerned with an increase in share value, 
then the management philosophy is seen as an efficient and effective construct.   According to 
Berle and Means, in their book, the Modern Corporation, there are a number of reasons for this 
shift in power from board members to managers.  Berle and Means, believe that the focus of 
firms became how to manage the complexities of the corporation and how to further build 
shareholder interest from outside the firm.  This created the need for professional and skilled 
management.
87
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Berle and Means also argued that the rise of the modern corporation has introduced a 
level playing field with the modern state.  They believe that the future may hold true to an action 
by the corporation that may even supersede the state as a dominate form of social organization.
88
  
One other theory concerning this important construct is this level of dominance that institutional 
stockholders have in corporations.  Useem, suggests that the institutional stockholder constructed 
a degree of power and authority in U.S. corporations of today.
89
   
This power and authority originates from the standpoint of a greater equity positions and 
has a greater influence on corporate decisions.  If this trend is consistent then institutional 
stockholders, could very likely become a voice for those that invest in their respective funds.  
Essentially the institutions would argue in defense of fair and orderly firm practices because the 
firm is operating with institutional money, which came from the holders of their investment fund.  
Finally concerning corporate structure, with increasing globalization of our financial markets, 
national governments have lost the ability to regulate some business communities.
90
  This is to 
say that globalization has created a new playing field, that best practices of our past may not be 
the best today; and will require continual reform and improvement.  
 
3.12 Competition in Securities Regulation 
 
                                                          
88 Adolph Berle and Gardomer Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. United States: Transaction 
Publishers, 1932. 
 
89 Useem, Michael.  Investor Capitalism, How Money Mangers are Changing the Face of Corporate America. 
United States:  Basic Books, 1999. 
http://books.google.com/books?id=2kFUMQlbAxgC&dq=Useem,+Investor+Capitalism.&printsec=frontcover&sour
ce=bn&hl=en&ei=unR4SsuGKNqntge3je2WCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4#.See also: Berle 
and Means revisited: the governance and power of large U.S. corporations, Mizruchi, Mark. University of Michigan 
April 2004. 
 
90 Jeffry Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global 
Finance.” Harvard University School of Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,45 (1991): 425-451.  
 
54 
 
Economist and politicians alike are consistently looking for a regulatory mechanism that 
will allow further growth and development in our economies today.  Globalization has increased 
the size and scope of the markets and presented a whole new level of concern.  We are seeing a 
tremendous opportunity for growth however this also presents the need for regulatory action on 
an international scale.  Concerning this new opportunity there are many challenges and numerous 
theories in the implementation of such a task. One theory that has received some attention 
recently is competition among regulatory bodies.   
 Some economist believe that competition among financial and securities regulators would 
be quite useful and would most likely result in a higher degree of regulation among private 
business, then what is present today.
91
  Current securities law is based on a rule of law 
perspective and not necessarily giving incentives to regulatory bodies to adjust because of a 
competitive advantage.  Consequently, it is up to the supporters of competition between federal 
and state regulatory bodies in U.S. and E.U. to validate its necessity.
92
  The question becomes, is 
competition the best means at creating a regulatory mechanism for the protection of investors 
and market efficiency? 
 The argument for competition has numerous fundamental theories and deeply held 
opinions.  Some believe that without competition there are no real mechanisms of incentives for 
economic growth and stability.  While others believe that strictly adhering to regulatory 
constructs will increase stability of the markets and investor protection.   At this point we know 
that competition involves numerous complexities and with limited time and financial constraints, 
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people are looking for ways to increase utility at the most efficient and effective ways.  Competition 
among regulatory bodies may create a new economy of scale with investors that are willing to pay 
more for better regulatory screening and disclosure.   
The government is also a substantial actor involved in the shaping of competition among 
regulatory bodies.  Whether we are speaking of judicial legislators or regulatory actors themselves, 
competition within their ranks will provide a vehicle for debate to establish best practices. 
Competition among regulatory bodies will help in decreasing fraudulent activity as well.  
Competition will essentially construct an incentive model that will further reform current practices 
and detect fraud on continual basis.  This further defends the argument of regulations being 
constructed around a practice of consistent reform.  
3.13 Domestic and International Regulatory Competition 
Fraud, insider trading and corporate misconduct are now an international issue unlike ever 
before.  If a U.S. corporation commits fraud then very likely the result of the action will spill over to 
the global community.  Our world is networked together almost forcing each country to work 
together for the benefit of each other.  If fraudulent activity continues to infiltrate itself further into 
the U.S. and world markets, then the underlying integrity of the markets will be up for debate.  This 
may result in reduced liquidity, raising the cost of capital and further jeopardizing the world financial 
markets. These actions consequently impose externalities on private investors around the world.93 
The work of the Financial Service Authority, International Accounting Standards Board and 
International Organization of Securities Commissions are important to developing a sound platform 
in the construction of international securities regulation.  These organizations have helped to develop 
platforms for debate and the establishment of far reaching networks.  The interrelated challenge with 
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developing and enforcing regulation has been quite difficult in drawing lines of responsibility.   For 
instance, if someone from a foreign country committed fraud in U.S. markets, is it the foreign 
country, the U.S. or both countries responsibility?  Is it the country where the person is from or is it 
the responsibility of the U.S. to provide regulatory constructs that will keep this activity from 
creating externalities in the markets?   This argument will continue for years to come.   
According to Trachtman, the challenge of unstable equilibrium and externalities essentially 
creates the need to address a much greater problem, and that is regulatory jurisdiction.  What is the 
most efficient mechanism for internalizing externalities, such as securities fraud?94  This question 
will be answered by each country individually.  By forging regulatory responsibility or jurisdiction 
on the country receiving the externality, would consequently demand that the country accepts 
responsibility.  This would be done by joining an international regulatory body and letting go of 
certain degrees of autonomy, as far as jurisdictional authority is concerned.  
3.14 Issuer Choice and Regulatory Competition 
However a possible idea in defense of issuer mobility in world markets is the theory of issuer 
choice.  One theory is for both domestic and international issuers to have the option to inter into a 
U.S. or foreign securities market, and avoid application of federal securities regulations.95  Professors 
such as Roberta Romano, believes that the current system of securities regulation which enforces 
uniform disclosure guidelines on all issuers, have essentially stymied growth and efficiency in the 
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securities markets.96   Professor Romano is essentially stating that in her view, we can find a better 
way of issuing new securities and providing a stable and efficient market on an international scale.  
Professor Romano goes on to explain; British retail investors might purchase common 
stock in a French company by placing an order through a British broker that has access to the 
Paris Bourse.   This new regulatory construct would allow issuers to choose what jurisdictional 
system of securities regulation they prefer.
97
 This construct would be a way to lay the framework 
for competition among nations around the world, in seeking to provide a mechanism for the most 
efficient and stable markets.  If governments and regulatory actors are consistently constructing 
and requiring competition among firms at the micro-level, why not require a similar policy 
among regulatory actors in our globalized world, at the macro-level?  After all globalization has 
essentially created a competitive playing field among the nations or world.  
 In order for issuer choice and regulatory competition to occur, both the opportunity for 
issuers to choose regulatory establishments and an effective price mechanism must be established.  
According to Howell Jackson, there must be a systemic policy in place that allows legal entities the 
opportunity to choose among regulatory regimes.98 Essentially, government and regulatory actors 
should open their doors to opportunities to choose regulatory constructs that fit the issuer‟s 
objectives.  Also the transaction cost associated with the choice of regulatory regimes, has to be 
economical in order for entities participation.99  If the transaction costs for issuing a security with a 
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certain regulatory establishment are too high; then the issuer will most likely choose the lesser cost 
regulatory institution.   
One way this may not be true, would be in the case that the issuer is marketing their security 
to a certain type of investor.  This would not be true if the issuer is looking to market their security to 
an investor looking for market stability and consistent growth patterns.  Then the issuer would look 
for a more closely held stringent regulatory organization that will most likely necessitate higher 
transaction costs.   These costs would essentially be passed onto the investor not necessarily held at 
the firm level.  Generally the investor would understand the cost to purchase this type of security as 
being higher because of the regulatory protection and stability that these organizations offer.   
Issuer choice and competitive securities regulation assumes numerous challenges.  Some of 
these challenges entail what regulatory constructs will be responsible for in the oversight of these 
organizations and is there a need for oversight given the competition among them?  Chiefly among 
them would be if governments are willing to relinquish a certain degree of autonomy to allow 
competitive risk among the regulatory organizations?  For example, once held premiere organization 
may or may not be all that effective and significant.  According to Frank Easterbrook, An interesting 
problem occurs from the fact that government itself may be a mechanism that constructs 
inappropriate constraints on competition.100   Easterbrook‟s argument is of course against 
government intrusion at least to a certain degree.   
Or maybe another way of looking at this would be what level of government intrusion 
would allow markets to experience efficiency yet remain effective concerning investor protection 
and disclosure rights?  However, even if governments are willing to relinquish autonomy 
concerning regulatory competition and jurisdictional oversight, there is still the problem of 
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cooperation among organizations.  The question remains, as to what extent are governments and 
regulatory actors willing to cooperate and to establish regulatory mechanisms that will construct 
efficient and stable markets?    
In this section I have further clarified a number of suggestions concerning domestic and 
international securities regulation.  These suggestions are meant to spark intellectual critique and 
further scholarly debate.  This section was constructed under the context of suggestive material 
and plausible normative solutions for securities regulation.  This article may well have a 
presumptive position throughout its context but it further highlights the need for consistent 
regulatory reform.  It is important that markets remain efficient and stable while allowing for 
economic growth and development.  
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“It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every Citizen who 
enjoys the protection of a Free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even 
of his personal services to the defense of it.” George Washington 
Conclusion: 
 It is not just the responsibility of governments or regulatory actors to construct 
mechanisms that will help to enforce reasonable and equitable standards among citizens and non-
citizens alike.  It is the responsibility of us all to work in concert, in the establishment and active 
execution of the regulatory standards in our markets.   Corporations, financial advisors, 
regulators, investors and governments around the world all share in this responsibility.  In this 
paper I have highlighted numerous suggestions that I hope will initiate further scholarly debate.  
However it is essentially that we focus on a few elements that this paper does suggest as sound 
indicative principles. 
 Securities regulatory reform should not be a reaction to crisis.  Securities regulation 
should be an adherence to ideological principles of integrity, efficiency, and stability.  If 
regulation is merely a reaction to crisis then there are two theories implicated.   The first is that 
regulatory actors must not have a clear understanding of the purpose of securities regulation.  
This is to say, there are still those among us which believe that regulation is primarily a 
mechanism that is only concerned with investor protection.   They seem to not fully comprehend 
that regulation should be a systemic construct created around the framework of efficiency.   
For example if investors feel that the securities markets are filled with fraudulent activity 
and corporate misconduct, then they are more likely to stay away from investing altogether.  If 
investors feel they are not getting full and fair disclosure of publicly traded firms, then they will 
most likely not invest in those firms either.  However, if regulatory organizations establish 
complex constraints and inefficient regulatory oversight, then the transaction costs of doing 
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business will be too high.  Consequently future business activities and competitive incentives 
will also decrease.   
Sure, one the purposes of securities regulation is to provide necessary constructs in 
protecting investors from unwanted externalities; however regulatory reform should be created in 
the framework of efficient markets. Secondly, citizens, governments and regulatory actors on a 
domestic level should review the philosophies and ideologies that formed the foundational 
principles of their respective country.  Guiding principles in the United States, such as freedom, 
integrity and the pursuit of happiness are some of the fundamentals that helped to construct the 
country, to what it is today.    With the onslaught of increased globalization and the very real 
problem of non-assimilation of immigrants, countries have got to know who they are and what 
they stand for. 
This is essential to the reform of securities regulations, not only domestically but also 
internationally.  Once this is known then regulatory bodies have a framework to construct and 
reform regulation to fit their respective ideologies.  Full and fair disclosure should be 
implemented on an international scale. Disclosure is an international challenge and should be 
met with the utmost respect.  What or who defines monetary and fiscal policies and who should 
regulate the markets, if so how?   Does the underlying country have a market of integrity or 
should they allow fraudulent activity to be rampant throughout their markets?  Knowing who we 
are will aid in the construction and reform of regulations.   
If the U.S., China or France is for example of a country that is truly concerned with 
integrity?  Then integrity should be a forced mechanism for consistent regulatory reform in our 
markets. 
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  Credit Default Swaps would be a prime example of this.  Going from zero to a 44 
trillion dollar market in only ten years with absolutely no regulatory oversight, is appalling and 
irreprehensible.  Why were there no real attempts of regulatory oversight on a security such as 
this?  If government and regulatory bodies agree to the ideological principles that guide and 
define their respective countries; then these bodies will have the framework in place for 
consistent measures of reform.  This fundamental principle will help keep regulation from being 
formed around crisis and allow ideological principles to be catalysts of reform.  I know this is 
idealistic to state and defend, however it essential that we make real and quantifiable progress in 
this direction.   
The financial crisis and current policy agendas will set the framework that will develop 
new and improved theories to institute stability, confidence and productivity into domestic and 
international securities markets.   A system of effective securities regulation will be the catalyst 
for increasing market efficiency and investment growth.  Consequently, effective securities 
regulation has a direct correlation on market efficiency and investment growth.  By making 
strides in the creation of competitive incentives concerning regulatory bodies we will essentially 
present an answer to problems associated in the domestic and international securities markets.   
This article defends numerous schools of economics, and highlights the importance of 
both macro and micro economic policies.  It also defends regulatory oversight to protect 
investors from fraudulent activity.  However it is the intention of this article to underline the 
fundamental principle, which states the answer to the financial crisis, is not one sided.  
Capitalism should still have an important place in our markets but capitalism must be met with 
the structure of effective and efficient regulatory framework. We must not only construct and 
consistently reform regulation at the macro-level but also at the micro-level, where real people 
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live and work every day.  The primary reason for regulation is efficiency incorporating the 
underlying principals of stability, growth, and integrity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
Works Cited: 
Abel, Bernanke, Croushore. Macroeconomics Sixth Edition. New York: Person 2008.   
 
Adolph Berle and Gardomer Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. United States: Transaction 
Publishers, 1932. 
 
Baumol and Blinder. Economics Principles and Policy. Hardcourt College Publishers 8
th
 ed. P.718. 
 
Business Cycles, Christian D Romer, “The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics.” Business Cycles. New York: Time 
Warner Company, 1993. 
 
Clark, Miller, Jentz, and Cross. “Corporations-Securities Regulation and Investor Protecton.” West’s Business Law 
United States: Thomson Learning, 2001. 
 
Clarkson, Miller, Jentz and Cross. West’s Business Law 8
th
 ed. United States: West Legal Studies in Business 
Thompson Learning, 2001.  Pg 691. 
 
Coffee, John C. “The Future as History: the Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance          and its 
Implications.” Northwestern School of Law, 1 April 1999. 
 
Coffee, John. The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and 
Control, Columbia University School of Law. New York: 2000.  Working Paper No182.  
 
Department of Labor.” Form 5500 Filings. 2008. < http://www.dol.gov/EBSA/5500MAIN.HTML>. 
Eatwell, Milgate and Newman. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 4 Q to Z. Macmillan Press Limited. 1987  
P.79. 
 
European Union.” Brief Summary of the De Larosiere Report. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/statement_20090225.pdf>. 
 
European Union.” Communication From the Commission to the European Council.  29 Oct 2008. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/statement_20090225.pdf> See also: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/Comm_20081126.pdf>. 
 
Feldstein, Martin. “National Bureau of Economic Research.” American Economic Policy in 1980’s Paul Joskow and 
Roger Noll 1981.  University of Chicago Press, 1 Sept 1995. 
 
Finance.” Harvard University School of Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,45 (1991): 425-451.  
Financial Law Institute Working Paper 99-15 Belgium: 1999.  
 
Fiori, Stefano. Herbert A. Simon and Contemporary Theories of Bounded Rationality. Working Paper Series. 
University of Turin, Department of Economics, Torino Italy: 2008.  
 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European Business law   de Gruyter-Recht 1996.   
<http://www.brandrepublic.com/InDepth/Analysis/674732/Internets-role-financial-disclosure-
debated/?DCMP=ILC-BETASEARCH>. 
 
Garrett, Ray Jr. “An inside look at Rule 10b-5.” Securities and Exchange Commission. 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1975/041075garrett.pdf>.  April 1975. See: Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222 (1980). 
65 
 
George, Bill, “Failed Leadership Caused the Financial Crisis.” US News & World Report.  19  Nov.2008. 
<http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2008/11/19/failed-leadership-caused-the-financial-crisis.html>. 
 
Graybow, Martha. “Reuters.” From Madoff to Standford, sleuths chase assets. 9Mar 2009 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE5271CZ20090309?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticN
ews>. 
 
Gross, Daniel. “Shattering Glass Steagall.” News Week. 2008. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/159092>. See also, 
Heakal, Reem. “What Was the Glass-Steagall Act?” Investopedia A Forbes Digital Company. 
<http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp>. 
 
Grossman and Helpman. “Protection for Sale.” American Economic Review Vol. 84, No. 4.  (1994) 833-850. 
Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu. “European Corporate Governance Institue.” Corporate Governance and the Returns 
on Investment. Working Paper No. 06/2003. University of Vienna: 2003. 
 
Haddock & Macey. Regulation on Demand, Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 20 No.2. Chicago: Oct. 1987.  
<http://www.jstor.org/pss/725499>. 
 
Institutional Asset Management Marketing Department. “Post-Modern Asset Management: The Credit Crisis and 
Beyond.” JP Morgan Chase & Co. 2009 pg 8 
 
Inter-American Conference of Securities Commission.” IOSCO Historical Background. 2009. 
<http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history>. 
 
Jackson, Howell. “Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999 – Part 
1.” Harvard University School of Law, Massachusetts: 2001. 
James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the Chicago School, Duke Law Journal. Vol. 
1986 No. 4 Durham NC: Sept. 1986. < http://www.jstor.org/pss/1372486>. 
Jeffry Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global 
Karmel, Roberta. Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe.  
Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School, 11 Dec. 2002. New York: 2002. 
 
Karmel, Roberta. Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe.  
Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School, 11 Dec. 2002. New York: 2002. 
 
Kroszner and Stratmann. “Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress:  Theory and Evidence 
from the Financial Services Political Action Committees,” Working Paper. University of Chicago, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1996. Chicago: 1996  
 
Kroszner, Randall. “On the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulatory Reform in Emerging Markets.” 
Working Paper. University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, 1998. Chicago: 1998. 
 
Lindstrom, Martin. buy-ology Truth and Lies About Why We Buy, New York: Doubleday, 2008. 
 
Lomax, Stan. “Moore School of Business University of South Carolina.”  Cooking the Books.  
<http://mooreschool.sc.edu/moore/research/Publications/BandE/bande49/49n3/cooking.html>. 
Mangiero, Susan. Pension Report Card - Process, Not Point in Time Numbers. 19 Nov. 2008.   
<http://www.pensionriskmatters.com/articles/asset-allocation/>. 
Merritt B. Fox. “The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for 
Securities.” Working Paper: Columbia University School of Law, 1998. New York:  MICH. L. REV. 696 (1998).  
66 
 
Mizruchi, Mark S. The American Corporate Network. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982. 
Norris, Floyd. “Looking Back at the Crash of ’29.” New York Times 15 Oct. 1999, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/financial/index-1929-crash.html>.  
 
North, Douglas. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1982. 
 
North, Douglass. Institution, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990.  
 
Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principals.”  Securities and Exchange Commission.  
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-46421.htm>. Aug 2002. See: Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 
Paredes, Troy, Blinded by the light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation. Faculty 
Working Papers Series No. 03-02-02. Washington University School of Law, 2003. Saint Louis: 2003. 
 
Perry, Brian. “An In-Depth Look at the Credit Crisis.” Investopedia a Forbes Digital Company.(2008):8 
<http://www.investopedia.com/university/credit-crisis/>. 
 
Perry, Brian.“An In-Depth Look at the Credit Crisis.”  Investopedia a Forbes Digital Company. (2008): 6 
<http://www.investopedia.com/university/credit-crisis/>. 
 
Pierre Salmon, “The Logic of Pressure Groups and the Structure of the Public.” European Journal of Political 
Economy 3 (1987): 55-86. 
 
Portney, Paul R. “The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.” Benefit-Cost Analysis. 2008.  
<http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BenefitCostAnalysis.html>. 
 
Posner, Richard. Theories of Economic Regulation, Working Paper. University of Chicago School of Law, Chicago: 
1974.  W0041. (Reviewing theories of regulation, including public interest theory, Public Enforcement of Securities 
Laws). 
Poterba, Rauh, Venti and Wise.  Defined Contribution Plans, Defined Benefit Plans, and the Accumulation of 
Retirement Wealth. Working Paper. 12597 National Bureau of Economic Research. 2006. 
 
 
 Public Interest Theory and Market Failure.” Texas Politics Theories of Economic Regulation. 
<http://www.laits.utexas.edu/txp_media/html/bur/features/0403_02/slide1.html>. 
 
Radcliffe, Brent. “Investopedia a Forbes Digital Company.” Can Keynesian Economics Reduce Boom-Bust Cycles?  
<http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/keynesian-economics.asp>. 
 
Romano, Roberta. Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation.   Yale University School of 
Law, 1998. Romano is concerned with competition in securities regulation within the United States most generally; 
however her further study extends to international constructs of transactions and foreign issuers of securities.  
Romer, Christina D. “Journal of Economic Perspectives.”  Changes in Business Cycles: Evidence and Explanations. 
Vol. 13, No.2 Spring 1999. University of California, Berkeley. 
<http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~cromer/JEP_Spring99.pdf>.      
Ryan, Jason. “ABC News.” Fraud Directly Related to Financial Crisis Probed.  11 Feb 2009. 
<http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Economy/story?id=6855179&page=1>. 
67 
 
Sec Historical.” 431 Days:  Joseph P. Kennedy and the Creation of the SEC. 1 Dec. 2005, 
<http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/kennedy/index.php>. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission.” Investment Advisors Act of 1940. 10 Aug 1998. 
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/ia1940.htm>. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission.” Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General 
Government.  11 Mar 2009.  <http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts031109mls.htm>. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission.” The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry. 26 Aug 2008. 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml>. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission.” Trust Indenture Act of 1939.  2004 Sept. 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/tia39.pdf>. 
 
Siegel, Jeremy. “Timely Investment Insights with Dr. Jeremy Siegel.”  Wells Fargo Advisors.   WEB Radio to Wells 
Fargo Adivors.  Saint Louis. 25 Mar. 2009. 
https://my.advisor<connection.com/infomax/PCG/marketing/marketing_news/norep/investor_ed_series/infomax
-pcg_announcement-0325-siegelwebcast.pdf?srcApp=search>. 
 
Simon, Herbert. “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 69 No. 1 (1955): 
99-118.  Stigler, George J. 1971. "Theory of Economic Regulation." Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 2 (Spring): 3-21. Peltzman, S. 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation." Journal of Law and 
Economics 19 (August): 211-40. Becker, G.S. 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence." Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August): 371-400.  
 
Thayer, Gary, Economic Comment Historic Changes, Wells Fargo Economic Group, 1 Oct. 2008. 
The European Union.”Key Facts and Figures about Europe and the Europeans.” 
<http://europa.eu/abc/keyfigures/index_en.htm>.  
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission.” Regulation S-K:. C.F.R. 299.10-229.702. 23 July 2009 
<http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ecfrlinks.shtml>. 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission.” The Investor’s Advocate:  How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation.  <http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml>. 
 
1
The Securities and Exchange Commission.” The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry. 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml:>  See 15 U.S.C>. 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission.” The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry. 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml:>  See 15 U.S.C.> Section 77 b(a)(1Title 15 Commerce and Trade.”  
Securities and Trust Indentures. 2008 Jan. <http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/15C2A.txt>. 
 
Title 17: Commodity and Securities Exchange, Part 240 General Rules and Regulations Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.”  GPO Access.   <http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr;sid=c9e95480522af21cb401afc0a81e0cb5;rgn=div5;view=text;node=17%3A3.0.1.1.1;idno=17;cc=ecfr#1
7:3.0.1.1.1.1.57.72>.   
 
Trachtman, Joel.  Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction in International Securities Regulation. Diss. 
Tufts University, 1999 Medford: See also: Choi & Guzman 1891. 
 
Trachtman, Joel. Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction in International Securities Regulation. 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Massachusetts: 1999.   
68 
 
 
 
United States House of Representatives.“ USC Investment Companies and Advisers.  1 Jan 2008. 
<http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/15C2D.txt>. 
 
Useem, Michael.  Investor Capitalism, How Money Mangers are Changing the Face of Corporate America. United 
States:  Basic Books, 1999.  
http://books.google.com/books?id=2kFUMQlbAxgC&dq=Useem,+Investor+Capitalism.&printsec=frontcover&sour
ce=bn&hl=en&ei=unR4SsuGKNqntge3je2WCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4#.See also: Berle 
and Means revisited: the governance and power of large U.S. corporations, Mizruchi, Mark. University of Michigan 
April 2004. 
 
Wymeersch, Eddy.  A Landmark Decision in European Company Law. University of Ghent  
 
Zingales, Luigi, The Future of Securities Regulation, Working Paper No. 08-27. University of Chicago 
NBER and ECGI, 2009. Chicago: 2009. 
 
Zingales, Luigi. The Future of Securities regulation. Working Paper. Chicago Booth School of Business, 29 Jan 2009. 
Chicago: 08-27. 
 
Zinglales, Luigi. Testimony on Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy. Before the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, United States House of Reps. Washington: 2008. 
 
 
Graph: 
Source: Seguin Financial Group, Economic Cycles: <http://www.seguinfinancial.com/Economic_Cycles.htm>. 
 
Source: ContraHour U.S. Domestic Debt: What Can Be Expanded, What Must Be 
Reduced?”<http://seekingalpha.com/article/116929-u-s-domestic-debt-what-can-be-expanded-what-must-be-
reduced>, 2009 
 
Source: ContraHour U.S. Domestic Debt: What Can Be Expanded, What Must Be 
Reduced?”<http://seekingalpha.com/article/116929-u-s-domestic-debt-what-can-be-expanded-what-must-be-
reduced> 2009. 
 
 
 
